Zum Inhalt springen

Leader Similarity and International Sanctions

03.12.2024 13:30 Uhr Hybrid: IOS (Raum 109) und Online Seminarreihe des AB Ökonomie

Talk by Jerg Gutmann (University of Hamburg) as part of the Research Seminar Series of the IOS Economics Department.

Political leaders matter, but statistical evidence for their relevance in international politics is scarce. We estimate panel probit models with data for the period 1970 to 2004 and sender-year and dyad fixed effects to evaluate whether more similar leaders are less likely to sanction each other. We find that higher leader similarity significantly reduces the likelihood of sanction imposition. The effect is especially pronounced when UN and EU sanctions are excluded, that is, when focusing on sanctions imposed through unilateral political decisions. In this case, going from no correlation to perfect correlation in the characteristics of the leader pair lowers the likelihood of sanctions by 5.7 pp. Moreover, leader similarity seems to matter especially for sanctions aimed at democratic change or human rights improvements, where political leaders are expected to enjoy more discretion.

Cookie-Einstellungen

Diese Webseite verwendet neben technisch notwendigen Cookies auch solche, deren Zweck die Analyse von Websitezugriffen oder die Personalisierung Ihrer Nutzererfahrung ist. Ihre Einwilligung in die Verwendung können Sie jederzeit hier widerrufen. Mehr Informationen zu den im Einzelnen genutzten Cookies und Ihrem Widerrufsrecht erhalten Sie in der Datenschutzerklärung.
Name Verwendung Laufzeit
privacylayerStatusvereinbarung Cookie-Hinweis1 Jahr
Name Verwendung Laufzeit
_pk_idMatomo13 Monate
_pk_refMatomo6 Monate
_pk_sesMatomo30 Minuten
_pk_cvarMatomo30 Minuten
_pk_hsrMatomo30 Minuten
_pk_testcookieMatomoEnde der Sitzung
Name Verwendung Laufzeit
vimeoVimeo Video Einbindung
youtubeYoutube Video Einbindung